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This thesis addresses policy and analytical challenges associated with the post-Cold
War personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) It examines a study conducted by the Joint Staff
called the Baseline Engagement Force (BEF) Assessment. The majority of the data were
obtained from the Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) of the
Joint Staff. The BEF Assessment determined the level of military effort required to
support peacetime engagement demands and revealed that PERSTEMPO reporting among
the Services is diverse in that reporting and tracking methods and concepts differ.
Misunderstanding of reporting and tracking methods and concepts led to under-reporting
ofPERSTEMPO. Errors, by a factor often, consistently occurred when reporting
PERSTEMPO to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Another finding was that the current PERSTEMPO is placing heavy demands on the
deployable pool, rather than the end strength. PERSTEMPO increases by twelve percent
when the deployable pool is placed in the denominator when calculating deployment
percentages. The Assessment also revealed that there is no tool for the Services to
conduct real time assessments ofPERSTEMPO. To make these assessments, a Baseline
Engagement Force Model was developed by the RAND Corporation and the Systems
Research and Applications (SRA) Corporation for the Joint Staff. This Model was
designed to produce alternatives for reducing the impact of deployments on military
members and to help determine policy regarding the capabilities of the unit deployment
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I. INTRODUCTION
The committee believes that the limitations of the balanced budget
agreement and the continual, demanding requirements of increasingly
frequent contingency deployments have stretched our military forces to the
breaking point.
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. Senate
1
In a post-Cold War environment, can the United States military indisputably meet
and unequivocally support all peacekeeping and smaller-scale contingency (SSC)
demands without compromising the All-Volunteer Force concept? If so, in
accomplishing these demands, is the United States military spread too thin?
One expert on U.S. military policy observed that "the eagerness of this
Administration to cut personnel and spending while refusing to cut military commitments
has left the military intolerably thin. Not only is the force level too small for many
missions, but the budget will not support even this inadequate force" (Hillen, 1998, p.
39).
It can be argued that America is involved in too many peacekeeping missions and
smaller-scale contingency operations. Furthermore, it can be argued that these demands
are producing a negative effect on the readiness and performance of our warriors for
fighting and winning future major theater wars (MTWs).
1 Quoted from Senate Committee Overview and Recommendations on the Department of Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. Report 105-189.
A. NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
The Preamble to the Constitution of the United States directs our Government to:
. . .provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,. . .
(Commager and Cantor, 1988, p. 139)
Without engagement and leadership by the United States in the area of
peacekeeping missions and smaller-scale contingency operations, we could see a possible
escalation of dangers that threaten our welfare, liberty, posterity, sovereignty, and values.
Dangers such as civil war, armed insurgency, ethnic and religious conflicts, guerilla
activity, separatist movements, border tensions, and political unrest characterize the
contemporary international security environment.
Fostering a more stable and peaceful world within this environment requires the
U.S. military to develop the capability to conduct peacekeeping and smaller-scale
contingency operations. These operations are important for our National Security, but
there are trade-offs. Increasing foreign missions for National Security, along with
decreasing personnel and defense dollars, can have negative effects on personnel,
maintenance, training, and overall readiness.
The 100 billion dollars that has been slashed from the U.S. defense budget over
the past nine years may be too large of a cut. The Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives commented in 1998 that defense spending should increase because "our
forces are not getting sufficient training and the other support necessary for them to
defend America or our interests around the globe" (Gingrich, 1998, p. 44).
A document prepared in December of 1997 by a senior Senate Budget Committee
analyst states that the National Training Center for the Army has had units rotating in
with significant (fifty to sixty percent) shortages in mechanics personnel and infantry
personnel (Roos, 1998). The document also states that "these shortages were described as
due to personnel being deployed abroad for missions such as Bosnia" (Roos, 1998, p. 18).
Furthermore, the document asserts that the increase in time away from home that Army
soldiers have experienced is due to peacekeeping missions (Roos, 1998).
B. THESIS FOCUS
The focus of this thesis centers on peacekeeping missions and smaller-scale
contingency operations, and the effect they have on personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) and
the All-Volunteer Force.
Due to the reduction in force size, along with the increase in peacetime
engagements, the deployable force has been spending up to fifty percent of their nights
away from home port and home bunk (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment
Directorate, 1997). Fifty percent may be too high of a number in trying to convince
military members to stay in the service, or furthermore, that a career in the military is a
propitious option. This high PERSTEMPO may be one of the major factors why "the
Navy has missed its retention goals four years running," or why "some ships are
undermanned by as much as twenty-five percent, especially in key areas" (Hillen, 1998,
p. 39).
The Report ofthe Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) notes that "if not
adequately managed, the demand for peacetime operations, coupled with a smaller force,
could overstress personnel operating tempo and take its toll on the quality of life of
military personnel that is the foundation of long-term readiness" (1997, p. 37).
Consequently, a high PERSTEMPO could endanger the All-Volunteer Force concept.
While PERSTEMPO is only one of the many factors that influence the quality of
life for military members and the career choices they make, it is a topic that has not been
seriously looked at until the Report ofthe Quadrennial Defense Review and the Baseline
Engagement Force Assessment.
This thesis investigates efforts that are underway to define, measure, and better
express the demands that have been and will be placed on the All-Volunteer Force. Is
something needed to better control these demands? How can senior leadership measure
these demands? If the All-Volunteer Force concept is to remain in place, military
leadership needs to carefully assess the role and extent that the military will play in
peacetime engagement activities.
C. OVERVIEW
Chapter II discusses the President's National Security Strategy, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff s (CJCS) National Military Strategy, and the Department of
Defense strategic personnel management goals. These three topics set the stage for
explaining why the U.S. military is engaged in so many missions and why PERSTEMPO
is at such a high level.
Chapter III discusses the Baseline Engagement Force Assessment. This was an
assessment conducted in 1 997 by the Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment
Directorate (J-8) of the Joint Staff. It was developed to gain quantifiable insights on the
level of effort required to support peacetime engagement and enlargement with an All-
Volunteer Force.
Chapter IV discusses the Baseline Engagement Force Model. This is a personnel
inventory and unit deployment model developed by the RAND Corporation and the
Systems Research and Applications (SRA) Corporation for the Joint Staff. The model
was derived from a Quadrennial Defense Review requirement.
Chapter V concludes with a summary of lessons learned. It also provides
recommendations for further research and commentary on the All-Volunteer Force of the
future.

II. U.S. FORCES AND THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
The focus of this chapter provides background information on the peacetime
engagement demands on the All-Volunteer Force. It begins by providing information on
U.S. challenges, opportunities, and the uncertain future that lies ahead with respect to the
President's National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. An assessment
of U.S. military forces and the demands that face them follows. The chapter concludes
by discussing Department of Defense strategic personnel management planning goals.
A. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND NATIONAL MILITARY
STRATEGY
While the threat of nuclear holocaust has been significantly
reduced, the world remains a very unsettled and dangerous place. Hostile
regimes and instability threaten U.S. interests in key regions. America
must remain actively engaged in this complex global environment.
William S. Cohen2
Secretary of Defense
1. Change, Challenges, and Opportunities
During the Cold War years, the United States military trained primarily to fight
and win major theater wars (MTW). The United States pursued a strategy of containing
the Soviet Union and the seven "satellite" nations in Eastern Europe who signed the
Quoted in Defense 97, from a statement to the House National Security Committee, February 1997, p. 4.
Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance in Warsaw on May 15, 1955. Led by men
like First Secretary Josef Stalin, First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, and Admiral
Gorshkov, the Warsaw Pact pursued the development of a modern and innovative fleet.
By 1986, the Soviets had amassed a Navy that Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman
described as follows:
What is particularly disturbing about the "fleet that Gorshkov
built" is that improvements in its individual unit capabilities have taken
place across broad areas. Submarines are faster, quieter, and have better
sensors and self-protection. Surface ships carry new generations of
missiles and radars. Aircraft have greater endurance and payloads. And
the people who operate this Soviet concept of a balanced fleet are ever
better trained and confident (Polmar, 1988, p. i).
Defeating the Warsaw Pact was the most demanding national security challenge
the United States faced since World War II. It dominated strategy, force planning, and
defense budgets for nearly half a century. Yet, after 40 years of continuous military,
economic, moral, and technological superiority, we were able to defeat the Communist
threat. When the Cold War ended, everything changed.
In 1991, the Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, Admiral William A. Owens,
stated:
The former Soviet aircraft carrier Kuznetsov was the manifestation
of what we had prepared for and trained against for decades - Soviet blue-
water, sea-control naval power. Now, in the summer of 1991, she had
entered the Mediterranean. But she had not come to challenge the Sixth
Fleet. She had left the Black Sea because there no longer was a Soviet
Union or a Soviet Black Sea Fleet. As we tracked her through the
Mediterranean, I had a poignant feeling of how much the world had
changed, and, as she neared the Atlantic, I radioed her captain, Sergei
Chekhov, wishing him "fair winds and following seas" for the voyage
home. He replied that he no longer knew where home was (Owens, 1995,
p. 2).
As the world watched the Soviet Union crumble and the Warsaw Pact dissolve in
the early 1990s, many assumed that the U.S. military no longer had a mission. Others
thought the bipolar world that had been dominated by the two superpowers (U.S. and
U.S.S.R.), would be replaced by a multipolar world. Still others claimed that the United
States would be the only superpower, and conflict among nations would become
obsolete.
Despite the end of the Cold War, it is clear that international conflict is not
obsolete. As the Chairman of the House National Security Committee pointed out in
1998, "rogue states like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq—no longer restrained by a bipolar
superpower balance of power, and increasingly desperate due to their isolation and
growing internal economic and political problems—are perhaps more threatening to their
neighbors and to U.S. interests than they were during the Cold War" (U.S. Congress,
House, February 12, 1998, p. 2).
In many ways, the task of achieving national security goals is more complex than
it was during the Cold War. New, smaller, less predictable, and more difficult to analyze
threats and dangers have surfaced that challenge and will continue to challenge our
military and political skills. Not only do we have military challenges external to the
United States, but we have a serious readiness problem. This problem, involving
balancing readiness, quality of life, declining budgets, manning, and operational tempo
(OPTEMPO) issues while continuing to execute a broad range of global missions, needs
to be managed prudently.
2. Uncertain Future
Between now and 2015, it is reasonable to assume that more than
one aspiring regional power will have both the desire and the means to
challenge U.S. interests militarily (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, 1997, p. 3).
As ofMarch of 1998, there were 53 countries around the world with unresolved
armed conflicts (Defense and Foreign Affairs Group, 1998). Appendix A lists these
countries and their conflicts. Civil war, armed insurgency, ethnic and religious conflicts,
guerilla activity, separatist movements, border tensions, and political unrest are prevalent
among these 53 countries. Another source lists 21 more places where conflicts may
restart (The Defense Monitor, 1998).
The Secretary of Defense points out that "as the 21st century approaches, the
United States faces a dynamic and uncertain security environment" (U.S. Department of
Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998, p. 1). In order for our Nation to shape
and respond to the threats and dangers that have surfaced around the world, our military
must remain actively engaged, often far beyond our shores. We must retain superior
military capabilities so that we can quickly respond, with other nations or alone.
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Togo D. West, Jr., former Secretary of the Army, points out that at one time,
many armed conflicts were restrained by the pressures of a bipolar global competition.
Now these conflicts are erupting because many Cold War constraints have dissolved
(U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1996). Furthermore,
the Chairman of the House National Security Committee stated that these conflicts have
"been a constant feature of the post-Cold War world, and U.S. troops have been sent on
more than one occasion to respond to what the Pentagon refers to as 'smaller-scale
contingencies' " (U.S. Congress, House, February 12, 1998, p. 3).
Other than fighting and winning wars, the U.S. military has many jobs.
Department of Defense operations, including peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and
smaller-scale contingency operations, involve anywhere from 35,000 to 40,000 people at
any time (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998). As a
result, the U.S. military is a very active organization. "On any given day, the Total Force
is deployed in support of 10 Joint/Combined Operations and participates in 1 1 exercises
in over 70 countries" (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 1997, p. 13).
3. Shape, Respond, Prepare Now
Guided by the President's 1 997 National Security Strategy and the Secretary of
Defense's Report ofthe Quadrennial Defense Review, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders,
formulated the 1 997 National Military Strategy. The National Military Strategy is a
11
document that provides "the strategic direction of the Armed Forces over the next three to
five years" (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 1997, p. 1).
Both the 1997 National Security Strategy and the Report ofthe Quadrennial
Defense Review call for an integrated strategic approach to defeating threats to U.S.
interests. Correspondingly, the National Military Strategy is built on this integrated
strategic approach.
The first goal of this integrated approach is to shape the international environment
in ways that enhance U.S. security interests. Shaping the international environment
includes overseas presence, smaller-scale contingency operations, international operations
and exercises, and peacekeeping operations.
Our military forces must be ready and trained to fulfill these roles and be ready to
fight and win two major theater wars almost simultaneously and alone. Our National
Security Strategy points out that "it is imperative that the United States, now and for the
foreseeable future, be able to deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two
distant theaters in overlapping time frames" (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, 1998, p. 8).
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Table 2. 1 is a list of overseas presence commitments. These forces play an
integral role in shaping the international environment.






The Army will maintain major portions of two heavy divisions in Europe
and one mechanized division in the Pacific region.
The Navy will maintain one carrier battle group and one amphibious
ready group in European waters, one carrier battle group and one
amphibious ready group in the Pacific, and one carrier battle group and
one amphibious ready group in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf for
portions of each year, as specified in the Global Naval Forces Policy.
The Air Force will maintain two fighter wing-equivalents in Europe, two
fighter wing-equivalents in the Asian/Pacific region, and one fighter
wing-equivalent in Southwest Asia.
The Marine Corps will maintain one Marine expeditionary force in the
Asian/Pacific region, in additions to those forces routinely deployed with
amphibious ready groups.
Beyond the presence requirements listed above, forces from all four Services carry out
periodic deployments in forward locations, as needs arise.
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998, p. J-3.
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The second goal of the National Military Strategy is to respond across the full
spectrum of crises. This encompasses everything from peacekeeping operations, to
smaller-scale contingency operations, to major theater wars. The Department of Defense
must be very careful when deciding where and how to respond to crises. "Responding to
multiple concurrent contingencies requires careful consideration to ensure our forces are
not dissipated and therefore either unable, or perceived as unable, to respond to more
critical threats" (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, 1997, p. 15).
An example of this problem arose in February, 1998, in the Persian Gulf. Along
with the USS George Washington operating in the Gulf, the USS Nimitz was relieved by
the USS Independence. This was not in long term planning. The Independence had been
cruising around the Asian Pacific for her final voyage before being decommissioned in
September of 1998. This cruise was to be somewhat of a 'victory lap' for her almost 40
years of Naval service to America. However, the Independence was detoured for the
massive buildup of sea and air forces in the Arabian Gulf region. All other U.S. aircraft
carriers were committed in other theaters (Graham, 1998).
The Chief ofNaval Operations, Admiral Jay L. Johnson, summed up the situation
when he stated that "ifwe have a two-carrier presence in the gulf, it means we have a
zero presence somewhere else. That's considered within the bounds of acceptable risks.
But there is an operational price to pay in other theaters" (Graham, 1998, p. A6).
Along that same line, the USS John C. Stennis was scheduled to participate in a
major NATO exercise (Exercise Strong Resolve) off the coasts ofNorway and Spain
14
from March 9 th to March 21 st 1998. Exercise Strong Resolve was long planned to be "the
largest NATO war game since the end of the Cold War" (Dorsey, 1998, p. A6). As the
exercise date neared, it was determined that Stennis would not able to participate because
she had to relieve the USS George Washington in the Persian Gulf.
The Chief ofNaval Operations stated that "the purpose of the U.S. Navy is to
influence directly and decisively events ashore from the sea - anytime, anywhere"
(Johnson, 1997, p. 8). If not carefully managed, we may over-stretch our "response
across the full spectrum of crises" and commit our military such that that we cannot
participate "anywhere" at "anytime".
The third and final goal of the integrated approach is to prepare now for the
uncertain future that lies ahead of us. While the first two goals are 'near term' in nature,
this goal incorporates our ability to "shape and respond effectively in the face of future
challenges" (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998, p. 9).
In order for this to occur, and in order for us to maintain the most formidable force in the
next century, leaders needs to carefully manage and balance defense dollars that go
towards quality of life, recruiting, equipment modernization, and infrastructure programs.
The future challenge is to balance those programs, along with endstrength and personnel
tempo issues, such that readiness for the All-Volunteer Force is not compromised. The
success of the prepare now approach "demands a stabilized investment program ... it
also requires fundamental reengineering of our infrastructure and streamlining of our
support structures" (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 1997, p. 17).
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The reengineering and streamlining of defense resources and capabilities was
carefully addressed in the Report ofthe Quadrennial Defense Review. Nevertheless, the
Senate Armed Services committee pointed out that they "are concerned that the armed
forces, even if enhanced with the capabilities envisioned in the QDR, may not be able to
execute the strategy [ability to win two concurrent major regional contingencies] without
excessive risks and casualties" (U.S. Congress, Senate, FY 1999). In order to avoid these
risks and casualties for our 21st century, high quality All-Volunteer Force, leaders must
prepare now so we can cautiously prioritize our resources and addresses future problems
that go beyond the need for simply more defense money.
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott succinctly addressed the issue of additional
funds by stating that "while I believe that more money needs to be allocated to our
National Defense, it needs to be done prudently. We need to get the missions, manning,
equipping, and pay and benefits synchronized to enable us to continue with a quality
force into the 21st century" (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1998).
4. Overseas Presence
Permanently stationed and rotationally or temporarily deployed
forces promote security and stability, prevent conflict, give substance to
our security commitments, and ensure our continued success (U.S.
Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 1997, p. 19).
Overseas presence determines to a large extent the overall shape and size of U.S.
forces. During fiscal year 1998, out of the 1.45 million men and women in the U.S.
16
military, about 200,000 were stationed overseas. U.S. forces stationed and deploying
overseas provide regional stability, support allies, and amplify deterrence.
U.S. forces also sustain credible military presence in several critical regions that
shape the international security environment in favorable ways. For example, in the
spring of 1998, "as United Nations Secretary General Koffi Annan recognized, the
influence of our overwhelming military presence in the Arabian Gulf region was a
decisive factor in convincing Saddam Hussein to come to terms in the latest crisis over
United Nations weapons inspectors" (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998, p. 2).
In each of the regions listed in this section, the Department of Defense takes an
active role in protecting U.S. national security interests. This active role can take any of
the forms indicated in Table 2.2.
a) Europe and Eurasia
Our leadership ensures U.S. forces work closely with NATO forces for
promoting security and stability throughout the European continent. From countering
drug trafficking and terrorism, to smaller-scale contingency operations, to the
proliferation ofNBC weapons and delivery systems, U.S. forces are active in Europe. As
the Chairman of the House National Security Committee states, this is displayed in
Bosnia where our troops have "become a large-scale commitment that promises to be the
central mission for U.S. forces in Europe for years to come" (U.S. Congress, House,
February 12, 1998, p. 3).
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Table 2.2: U.S. Overseas Presence in Several Forms
Permanently stationed forces Humanitarian demining




Combined exercises Nation assistance
Port call and other force visits Foreign military interactions
Security assistance offices Defense attaches
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
1996, p. 12.
There are approximately 100,000 U.S. men and women stationed in
Europe, not including a continuous presence of U.S. Naval and Marine Corps forces in
the Mediterranean Sea. Maintaining this level of U.S. forces in Europe is essential for
preserving U.S. influence and leadership in NATO, providing a visible deterrent, and
maintaining overall security and stability in that region (U.S. President, 1997).
U.S. military presence in this region consists of two Army divisions, two
Air Force fighter wing-equivalents, a Marine expeditionary force, and a Navy carrier
battle group and amphibious squadron.
18
b) East Asia and the Pacific
We have significant interests in Japan, the Korean Peninsula, and China.
In order for the U.S. to play the role as "security guarantor and regional balancer" (U.S.
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998, p. 12), the Department
of Defense is committed to maintaining a level of approximately 100,000 troops in this
region. This includes an Army division, two and a half Air Force fighter wing-
equivalents, a Marine expeditionary force, and a Navy carrier battle group and
amphibious squadron.
c) Middle East and Southwest Asia
U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf will continue to confront
a variety of dangers from Iraq and Iran as these countries pose threats to their neighbors.
In July of 1998, U.S. and Israeli officials confirmed that Iran tested a medium-range
missile with an estimated range of 800 miles. Although this test was not successful, a
missile such as the one tested could give Iran the capability of striking Israel or U.S.
troops in the Persian Gulf region (King, et al., 1998).
With Israel being the only nuclear power in the region, and its missiles
capable of striking almost any Middle East country, Iran has been pressing to get a
medium-range missile in operation. There have been estimates that show "Iran will have
a medium-range missile capable of hitting Saudi Arabia and Israel in as little as 10 years"
(King, et al., 1998, p. 1).
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After the 1998 missile test, Iran was not the only country the U.S. was
concerned with. "The White House condemned the test as 'antithetical' to the security of
the region and criticized North Korea for selling missiles to Iran" (King, et al., 1998, p.
1).
U.S. overseas commitments in this region consist of an Air Force fighter
wing-equivalent, a Marine expeditionary force, and a Navy carrier battle group and
amphibious squadron. With nearly half our oil needs coming from imports, and a
majority of these imports coming from the Persian Gulf region, it is unlikely that U.S.
military commitment in this region will be reduced.
5. Strategy Implementation
Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must undergo
the fatigue of supporting it.
Thomas Paine3
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In an effort to implement a strategy for keeping America safer and more
prosperous, the President's National Security Strategy lays out six strategic priorities.
Four of these strategic priorities, directly related to the military, are explained below.
One of the President's strategic priorities is to "foster an undivided, democratic
and peaceful Europe" (U.S. President, 1997, p. 2). With over 100,000 U.S. troops in
Europe (see Table 2.3), the military plays a substantial role in supporting this priority.
3 Quoted in "Report of the National Defense Panel", December 1997, p. 3.
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While progress has been made with NATO in strengthening Europe's west, there is
considerable interest in developing military alliances with Europe's east.
Table 2.3: Shaping the International Environment in Europe
Air Force Two fighter wing-equivalents




A Marine expeditionary unit
Navy One carrier battle group and one amphibious ready group
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998,
p. 23).
The Army alone has put over 1 1 ,000 active and reserve component soldiers and
civilians in Bosnia (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
1998). This demonstration of U.S. support to NATO allies enhances conditions
necessary to implement the Dayton Peace Accords and foster a peaceful Europe.
A second strategic priority is to "forge a strong and stable Asia Pacific
community" (U.S. President, 1997, p. 2). With a vast array of forces (see Table 2.4) and
over 100,000 U.S. men and women, the military proceeds with a robust forward presence
policy in the Asia Pacific community.
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Table 2.4: Shaping the International Environment in Asia and the Pacific
Air Force Four fighter wing-equivalents
Army One mechanized division and one light infantry division
Marine
Corps
Two Marine expeditionary units
Navy Two carrier battle groups and two amphibious ready
groups
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998,
pp. 23 and 24).
A third strategic priority is to "continue America's leadership as the world's most
important force for peace" (U.S. President, 1997, p. 2). Along with approximately
200,000 military personnel who are permanently stationed in Europe and the Pacific,
there is a "a strong rotational presence of about 25,000 personnel in Southwest Asia and
15,000 in the Caribbean Basin-Latin America region" (U.S. Department of Defense,
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998, p. 3). Every month, about
43,000 U.S. troops are committed to peacekeeping efforts, various smaller-scale
contingencies, and humanitarian efforts around the world.
A fourth and final strategic priority from the President, that will be discussed in
this thesis, is to "strengthen the military and diplomatic tools necessary to meet these
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challenges" (U.S. President, 1997, p. 2). The military must be able and ready to defend
our country and our way of life. President Clinton emphasizes that in order for this to
happen, we must first take care of the men and women of our U.S. forces (U.S. President,
1997). The next section of this chapter will address this issue.
B. FORCE ASSESSMENT
There is clear evidence that the combat readiness of the armed
forces is at greater risk due to two key factors: older and harder-to-
maintain equipment resulting from inadequate modernization and the
overuse of a smaller force structure.
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. Senate
4
1. Size of U.S. Forces and the Defense Budget
The Department of Defense budget has been declining, measured in constant
dollars, over the past fourteen years. In 1985, the Defense budget was $400 billion (in
constant, fiscal year 1997 dollars) which constituted 28 percent of our national budget. In
1997, the Defense budget was $250 billion and constituted 15 percent of our national
budget.
Military manpower has also been declining. In 1985, the Department of Defense
had over 2.2 million men and women in uniform. In 1997, the U.S. had about 1.45
million men and women in uniform.
4 Quoted from Senate Committee Overview and Recommendations on the Department of Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. Report 105-189.
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The Report ofthe Quadrennial Defense Review states that "in making these
reductions, we have carefully protected the readiness of our military to carry out its
currently assigned missions" (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, 1997). However, the cutbacks do not stop at fiscal year 1997.
The outlook for the fiscal year 1999 Defense budget is approximately 4.5 percent
less than the fiscal year 1997 budget (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, 1998) and represents "the lowest level of inflation-adjusted defense
spending since before the Korean War" (U.S. Congress, House, May 21, 1998, p. 1).
Additionally, the Report ofthe Quadrennial Defense Review highlights that the number
of active duty military personnel will be reduced to 1.36 million men and women—a drop
of thirty-six percent from fiscal year 1989 and a drop of more than six percent from fiscal
year 1997 (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997).
While the Department of Defense is taking a considerable interest in protecting
readiness and quality of life issues, with dwindling defense budgets and shrinking end
strength, it is getting tougher each year. In the spring of 1998, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
testified to Congress that the fiscal year 1999 budget for the military "contained shortfalls
of more than 10 billion dollars, and shortfalls of more than 58 billion dollars over the next
five years" (U.S. Congress, House, May 21, 1998).
There is a growing concern for quality of life, readiness, and modernization
shortfalls. If defense budgets continue to shrink, it will become more difficult for the
Department of Defense to make improvements for the All-Volunteer Force in these
24
already difficult areas. As the Chairman of the House National Security Committee
stated,
I do not understand how any of us can expect the military services
to stabilize their smaller QDR force structure, protect quality of life and
readiness and begin to end the decade-long procurement holiday when we
are dealing with budgets that are tens of billions of dollars short of keeping
pace with inflation. Quality of life, readiness and modernization are all
suffering and there is no end in sight to the fourteen year trend of declining
defense budgets. The "robbing Peter to pay Paul" metaphor simply does
not work any longer. As far as I am concerned, Peter and Paul are both
getting robbed blind (U.S. Congress, House, March 12, 1998, p. 2)
Increasing foreign missions for National Security, along with decreasing
personnel and defense dollars, can have negative effects on personnel, maintenance,
training, and overall readiness. The decision to cut U.S. personnel and the military
budget has been carefully assessed. Nonetheless, the turbulence and possible future
unforeseen problems that are difficult to measure (i.e., readiness) have not been assessed
so clearly.
2. The All-Volunteer Force
In 1973, the first time since before World War II, the Department of Defense
instituted the All-Volunteer Force. Now, a quarter of a century later, the All-Volunteer
Force has survived the Cold War, a post-Cold War draw down, several peacekeeping and
smaller-scale contingency operations, and a major conflict (Desert Storm). Today's All-
Volunteer Force is engaged in the wide range of missions that have increasingly come to
characterize the post-Cold War. While the All-Volunteer Force concept has worked
25
relatively well since 1973, fewer dollars and troops and more missions may be
endangering it.
In March of 1998, the Chairman of the House National Security Committee
opened a hearing with the two Regional Commanders-In-Chief. They were General
Wesley K. Clark, commander-in-chief of U.S. European Command, and General
Anthony C. Zinni, commander-in-chief of U.S. Central Command. The Chairman stated:
General Clark, General Zinni, you help to lead the most capable
military the world has ever seen, but the risk to the viability of our forces
grows everyday. I hope you will address the issue of how much risk is too
much? And how much longer we can ask the troops you command to do
more with less? (U.S. Congress, House, March 5, 1998, p. 1)
It has become exceedingly difficult for the Department of Defense to maintain the
All-Volunteer Force. However, with proper management and leadership, maintaining the
All-Volunteer Force is far from impossible. The next section will highlight some of the
management and leadership practices and goals that characterizes the Department of
Defense's interest in preserving the All-Volunteer Force.
C. STRATEGIC PLANNING: DOD GOALS
We have had three different reviews of our national strategy since
the end of the Cold War, and the end result of all these reviews has been to
reduce the size of the force to where it is now, its lowest level since before
the Korean War. These reductions have not been balanced out with a
similar reduction in the number of missions and deployments.
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott
Letter to the U.S. President
June 26, 1998
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According to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), all
cabinet departments are required "to engage in a cycle of strategic planning, performance
planning, and evaluation of achievements against the performance plan" (U.S.
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998, p. J-l).
The strategic plan for the Department of Defense is outlined in the Report ofthe
Quadrennial Defense Review. This document was derived from the President's National
Security Strategy. After the Report ofthe Quadrennial Defense Review was completed,
the Department of Defense produced six corporate-level goals. A performance plan that
assesses the level of achievement for each of the six goals was submitted to Congress
with the fiscal year 1999 budget. A performance report (assessment of performance on
each of the six goals) is to be provided to Congress by March 2000. The process of
strategic planning, performance planning, and evaluation, will become a recurring cycle
that must be updated by each cabinet department at least every three years (U.S.
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998).
Goal Five, "Maintain highly ready joint forces to perform the full spectrum of
military activities," (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
1998, p. J-6), incorporates deployment and personnel management issues. These issues
are easily seen but not easily measured due to the complex metrics involved in assessing
them.
Outlined below, are three of the four distinct elements of Goal Five for the
Department of Defense's first GPRA performance plan.
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1. Maintain High Personnel and Unit Readiness
Readiness is defined as "the ability of forces, units, weapon systems, or
equipment to deliver the outputs for which they were designed (includes the ability to
deploy and employ without unacceptable delays)" (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1994, p. 237).
The Department of Defense measures readiness using the Status of Resources and
Training System (SORTS). Within SORTS, there are five levels of readiness. Each level
takes into account "personnel readiness, manning levels, the amount of equipment issued
to a unit and the state of the equipment's maintenance, and the state of the unit's training"
(U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998, p. J-6).
C-l is the highest level of readiness and C-5 is the lowest level of readiness. C-3
is the lowest level of readiness that is acceptable for an active duty unit. A unit with a
rating of C-3 would not only require additional training, but most likely would also need
additional equipment and personnel in order for the unit to deploy and carry out its
mission effectively.
The United States General Accounting Office states that SORTS does not take
into account some critical readiness factors such as operating tempo and personnel morale
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996). The report states that "in contrast to SORTS
data, our visits to high-deploying units and discussions with officials in major commands
revealed pronounced concerns about personnel problems such as divorces, missed family
events and holidays, and lowered retention" (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996, p.
3). A 1996 GAO report points out that while actions are underway to address operating
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tempo, the Services do not have "goals or polices to limit PERSTEMPO"—there are "no
clear regulations on this issue" (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996, p. 3).
Since 1996, this has changed. Each Service now has guidelines that limit
PERSTEMPO. What has not changed is the inability to measure stress on the force.
Chapter IV will address this issue.
2. Recruit and Retain Well-Qualified Military and Civilian Personnel
I am very concerned about the growing inability of our country to
man the uniformed services. Not only is there difficulty in recruiting, but
also in our ability to retain key personnel.
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott
Letter to the U.S. President
June 26, 1998
Recruiting and retention are important factors for maintaining and keeping a high-
quality, ready All-Volunteer Force. As Chapter III will point out, it is not the total force
that carries most of the PERSTEMPO burden, but those forces who are the regular
deployers—those who have the skills and training that is needed for peacekeeping and
smaller-scale contingency operations. It is these men and women—who patrol Bosnia,
the Persian Gulf, the no-fly zones, Somalia, and Haiti—who are most likely to leave the
military (Roos, 1998).
The troops that leave the military can be replaced, but it is not an easy task—from
a financial and readiness standpoint. At the mid-point of his or her career, the Air Force
has invested approximately $4 million into training a pilot (Roos, 1 998). "It takes about
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1 years to train a soldier in an armor unit to the level required for him to effectively
command the crew of a main battle tank" (Roos, 1998, p. 18).
The U.S. House Committee Report on the fiscal year 1999 National Defense
Authorization Act states that "the committee continues to be concerned that the services
are not able to attract sufficient high quality recruits to maintain the quality force so
critical to military readiness" (U.S. Congress, House Committee Report, Title V). It also
stated that
the Army was barely able to meet their recruiting objectives in
fiscal year 1997 despite reducing recruit quality objectives, increasing the
number of field recruiters, lowering accession goals, and adding over
$100.0 million to recruiting accounts (U.S. Congress, House Committee
Report, Title V).
The Navy has experienced similar problems. "During the first quarter of fiscal
year 1998, Navy recruiters missed their mission by over 1,400 recruits and the Navy
offered little hope of recovery before the end of the year" (U.S. Congress, House
Committee Report, Title V).
The strong U.S. economy and the attraction of college for America's young people
has made recruiting and retaining difficult for the All-Volunteer Force. In 1997, the U.S.
unemployment rate was at 4.8 percent, the lowest rate since 1973 (Karl, 1997). In the
spring of 1998, one in three Fortune 500 companies were hiring (CNN, 1998) and the
United States had the lowest core inflation in 30 years and the lowest welfare rolls in 27
years (U.S. President, 1998).
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3. Improve Force Management Procedures Throughout DoD
As the U.S. armed forces continue to downsize and the number of peacekeeping
and smaller-scale contingency operations remain at the same level or expand, it may
become increasingly difficult to retain high quality personnel. Maintaining and training
military personnel is a Department of Defense challenge that requires innovative
leadership, diligent planning, and careful management of resources. If force management
procedures are left unchecked, the viability of the All-Volunteer Force may be in
jeopardy.
The Department of Defense has made great strides with force management over
the past few years. As Chapter III will show, PERSTEMPO and its impact on the All-
Volunteer Force has received great interest from the Service Chiefs, the combatant
commanders, their staffs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff. As
one General, (head of the Air Force's Air Combat Command) acknowledged, "We've got
some severe stresses. There's not enough resilience in the force" (Newman, 1998, p. 40).
The number ofjoint exercises that are scheduled through the year 2000 has been
reduced by about 10 percent (Roos, 1998). Services have limited the maximum time
soldiers and sailors should spend away from home station. The Services have also
developed better tracking systems to monitor this time away from home station
—
PERSTEMPO. But, force management issues and problems that are sometimes easily
seen, are not so easily tracked and measured. Chapters III and IV address these issues.
OPTEMPO / PERSTEMPO are not the only factors one must consider when
assessing what it takes to attract and retain top quality military personnel. The 1 998
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Annual Report to the President and the Congress lists fifty-four quantitative measures for
readiness, recruiting, and retention. Twelve of the fifty-four measures are displayed in
Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Quantitative Readiness, Recruiting, and Retention Factors
Pay, bonuses, and allowances Time away from home
Promotion opportunity Family and bachelor housing units
Attitudes toward military service Percent of military jobs open to women
Funding for unit training Privatized family housing
Number ofDoD family centers Degrees awarded
Civilian work force opportunity Discrimination / harassment complaints
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998,
pp. J-13andJ-14.
As stated earlier in this chapter, one should not underestimate the international
conflict challenges that lie ahead of us. Each service is not only responsible for preparing
for these challenges, but they are also responsible for assessing peacetime engagements
and smaller-scale contingency operations, and determining their own OPTEMPO.
Although organizing and training sailors and troops may be difficult with defense
resource shortfalls, there are few options in supporting the President's National Security
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Strategy. When addressing this issue, the Chairman of the House National Security
Committee stated that
Congress will never be able to do more than make improvements at
the margin in the absence of additional defense resources. The magnitude
of the shortfall is so great that they [quality of life, readiness and other
resource shortfalls] cannot be eliminated by simply reprioritizing the
President's request (U.S. Congress, House, May 21, 1998, p. 1).
This section has shown that the future of the All-Volunteer Force does not solely
rest on money issues, but also on management procedures and leadership ability.
D. SUMMARY
Peacekeeping and smaller-scale contingency operations have not declined in
numbers due to the end of the Cold War. In fact, they have increased. This increase,
along with the fact that active duty end strength has been reduced by approximately
thirty-five percent since 1989, has increased PERSTEMPO for the U.S. military.
Although PERSTEMPO is not the only issue that needs to be considered when discussing
military quality of life and readiness aspects for the All-Volunteer Force, it is a prominent
feature.
In 1989, when addressing the funding constraints that Congress had placed on the
military during the initial post-Cold War reduced budgets, a well known military analyst
wrote that the "services tend to see such a diet [funding constraints] as a temporary state
of affairs—one that will change when the 'enemy' manifests itself or when the political
winds shift again in their favor" (Builder, 1989, pp. 202-203).
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Perhaps the Services did see it that way at one time, but now that nine years have
passed and the political winds continue to blow towards growing resource shortfalls, it is
becoming more and more difficult to be as optimistic as the Services were in 1989.
Senior leaders, both civilian and military, are now asking themselves, as General
Clark and General Zinni were asked in the spring of 1998, "How much risk is too much?
How much longer can we ask the troops to do more with less?"
The House National Security Chairman states that "the list of peacekeeping
commitments continues to grow: from the Sinai, to Haiti, to Somalia, to Rwanda" (U.S.
Congress, House, February 12, 1998). Fourteen years of military budget reductions have
been far from "a temporary state of affairs," and the next fourteen years portrays a similar
outlook—an active military force, doing more with less.
The Annual Report to the President and the Congress states that PERSTEMPO is
at "acceptable levels" but also states that "the Department [of Defense] has made
PERSTEMPO a focus of its quality of life effort in order to avoid future problems" (U.S.
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998, p. 91). Chapter III and
Chapter IV will deliver insight on how the Department of Defense, specifically the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, has undertaken efforts to address peacetime engagement demands, to
measure these demands, and to avoid future problems. The fate of the All-Volunteer
Force may depend on our ability to accurately measure and evaluate these demands.
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III. BASELINE ENGAGEMENT FORCE ASSESSMENT
The focus of this chapter is an assessment conducted by the Force Structure,
Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) of the Joint Staff. This assessment, called
the Baseline Engagement Force Assessment, was developed to gain quantifiable insights
on the level of effort required to support peacetime engagement and enlargement with an
All-Volunteer Force.
Major General Hamilton, Vice Director of the Force Structure, Resources, and
Assessment Directorate (J-8), chaired the Force Structure Panel of the Quadrennial
Defense Review. During the Quadrennial Defense Review process, Major General
Hamilton saw a need to quantify the demand on the All-Volunteer Force and the amount
of effort needed to support peacetime engagement activities.
Significant factors supporting this need include:
- The Bottom Up Review (BUR) evaluated engagement activities
but assumed the capabilities required were lesser and [were] included
within the two Major Regional Conflict (MRC) force structure;
- The intelligence community and the Joint Strategy Review (JSR)
indicated the engagement activities for the last five years would be similar
to the near term future;
- Two Services typically associated with Major Regional Conflict
force structure (Army and Air Force) were migrating to engagement
activities more typically associated with the maritime forces;
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- Multiple reports were received [from both senior military and
civilian leaders via discussions with troops and sailors] of personnel
spending "a large number of days" away from their families and / or home
station;
- The overall force structure was going down, but peacetime
engagement activities were going up; and
- When asked, Services were not able to produce a broad and
quantifiable data base to articulate peacetime demand (U.S. Department of
Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force
Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, 1997, p. 1).
Correspondingly, a study was conducted from the fall of 1996 to the summer of
1997, where these issues were investigated. The study, called the Baseline Engagement
Force Assessment, was a collaborative effort among the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the Military Services, and selected Commanders in Chief
(CINCs).
Over a period of six months, the Baseline Engagement Force Assessment
collected PERSTEMPO data from all the Services. Data were collected on seven
different dates. For trend information, the data collection dates were July 1992, July
1993, July 1994, July 1995, and July 1996. The other two data dates were February 1991
(start of Desert Storm ground campaign) and October 1994 (peak smaller-scale
contingency operations during the Haiti buildup).
A. DEPLOYMENT DEMANDS
Figure 3.1 displays the variance among deployment reporting methods for all
active duty forces from the July 1 996 Baseline Engagement Force Assessment data. Each
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column in Figure 3.1 indicates the percentage of forces deployed as calculated by one of
the specific reporting methods. The percentage of forces deployed is different for each of
the five columns because of differences in measurement systems and reporting methods.
Deployment data for the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps are included
in each of the five reporting methods in Figure 3.1. Each column also represents the
high-low range among the Services. For example, the horizontal line in column two is at
six percent. The top of column two is at fourteen percent. The horizontal line at six
percent represents the lowest deployment percentage among the Services and the top of
the column at fourteen percent represents the highest deployment percentage among the
Services.
1. Column One: Weekly Brief
Every week the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff are briefed on the deployed force operating tempo. Column one represents the
average number that was briefed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
Secretary of Defense for 1996. It is the average of the weekly inputs by the Commander-
in-Chief staffs for forces deployed to selected major named operations. Column one
indicates that a maximum of six percent of the active duty end strength is deployed.
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Figure 3.1 : Methods ofPERSTEMPO Reporting
Percent 30
Fiscal Year 1996 TEMPO
Reporting Methods
1. Weekly brief to Secretary of Defense and CJCS.
2. Routine exercises and support activities over end strength.
3. Routine exercises and support activities plus one year overseas tour
over end strength
4. Routine exercises and support activities plus one year overseas tour
over deployable pool
5. Deployable forces away from home bunk / home pier
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment
Directorate (J-8), 1997.
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2. Column Two: Various Exercises and Deployments
While column one is limited to only major named operations, column two is not.
Column two includes those forces on routine deployment, forces involved in exercises,
forces supporting partnership for peace commitments, and forces in various theater
support activities. Column two indicates that a maximum of fourteen percent of the
active duty end strength is deployed.
3. Column Three: Overseas Tours
Column two does not include U.S. forces deployed on unaccompanied overseas
tours. The duration of unaccompanied overseas tours vary from twelve to fifteen months,
depending on the Service and the duty station. During this twelve to fifteen month
period, families are not stationed with military members.
Until November of 1 996, personnel on unaccompanied overseas tours were not
tracked as deployed forces. Following November of 1996, the Secretary ofDefense
directed that all personnel on unaccompanied overseas tours be reported as deployed
forces.
The number of personnel on unaccompanied overseas tours varies among the
Services. The numbers for the Army are between 25,000 and 30,000. This large number
of forces on mandatory unaccompanied overseas tours is, for most part, due to two Army
brigades in Korea and the anti-terrorism force protection policy adopted by the U.S.
military shortly after the Kobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia.
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The four percent increase for the maximum deployed active duty end strength,
from column two to column three, is due to including personnel on unaccompanied
overseas tours as deployed. Column three indicates that a maximum of sixteen percent of
the active duty end strength is deployed.
4. Column Four: The Deployable Pool
Ideally, the Baseline Engagement Force Assessment wanted deployment data
from the Services such that when a Service member was away from home port or home
bunk, he or she was considered deployed. None of the Services could produce this data.
With this in mind, the Baseline Engagement Force Assessment, with inputs from the
Services, developed a concept called the deployable pool.
The deployable pool consists of forces available to immediately respond to a
crisis. While each Service had a definition of deployment (see Table 3.2), the deployable
pool was not defined. The Baseline Engagement Force Assessment defined the
deployable pool to establish a concrete standard for determining deployment percentages
for all the Services.
Table 3.2: Service Definitions of Deployment
Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps
7 days or more
(3 days for
Special Forces)
56 days or more 1 day or more
1 days or more away
from home station
Source: U.S. Government Accounting Office, 1996, p. 16.
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One of the major insights provided by the Baseline Engagement Force
Assessment is that the deployable pool is absorbing the burden of deployments, not the
total Service end strength. The Baseline Engagement Force Assessment defined the
deployable pool as shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: The Deployable Pool
Service Definition of Deployable Pool
Air Force Forces reported as current operations, forward
based, domestic MRC forces, and strategic
forces
Army All Modified Table of Organization and
Equipment (MTOE) forces (except the 2nd
Division in Korea, one division in Germany, and
two other units that are non deployable MTOE
forces)
Marine Corps The Fleet Marine Force
Navy All ships and squadrons
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment
Directorate, 1997.
Column four in Figure 3.1 represents the same data as column three, except the
denominator for column three is the total Service end strength, and the denominator for
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column four is the deployable pool. This difference results in an twelve percent increase
for those reported as deployed. Reflecting this increase, column four indicates that a
maximum of twenty-eight percent of the deployable pool is deployed.
5. Column Five: Away From Home
The fifth and final column in Figure 3.1 represents another increase in the
percent of personnel deployed, and more diversity among reporting methods and
concepts. In this column, a deployment is defined as any activity that will result in the
Service member not being able to come home at night (not including duty nights). This
includes, but is not limited to, local training, work-ups, and exercise operations. When
these numbers are included and added to column four, the deployment percentage reaches
fifty percent.
Column five indicates that on the average, at any given time during fiscal year
1996, half of the deployable forces were away from home. This is in contrast to the six
percent figure that was reported to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
B. COLD WAR VERSUS POST-COLD WAR PERSTEMPO
After understanding what the Baseline Engagement Force Assessment revealed,
faults can easily be found in other reporting methods and concepts. This section
identifies and discusses some of those faults.
Consider Figure 3.4, a graph that was published in the Army Times. The article
that accompanies the graph discusses a high PERSTEMPO in the U.S. military. The
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graph has a few misleading elements that will be discussed in the remainder of this
section.







*Data is approximate based on family separation allowance
DSeriesI
Cold War perstempo 1988-1990
USMC Air Force
Series2
Post-Cold War perstempo 1992-1996
Source: Army Times, January 19, 1998, p. 4.
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1. Family Separation Allowance
Family separation allowance (FSA) is a non-taxable monthly pay of seventy-five
dollars to Service members who have been deployed for thirty days for more. The data
from Figure 3.4 are based on family separation allowance. Although the reader may
notice this in the small print below the graph, the reader may not know that family
separation allowance is not authorized until day 30 of a deployment. The data does not
take into account personnel away from home port or home bunk for periods less than
thirty days. In other words, personnel in the Navy, returning home from sea on day 29,
are not considered deployed using this parameter.
The majority of all training and local operating exercises for the Navy consist of
underway periods fewer than thirty days. With this in mind, and from what the Baseline
Engagement Force Assessment revealed, it can be assumed that the deployment
percentages in Figure 3.4 are underestimated by as much as thirty-five percent.
This underestimation of thirty-five percent assumes that the average of the
percentages in Figure 3.4 is comparable to column three of Figure 3.1. That is, family
separation allowance does not: 1) take into account the difference between end strength
and the deployable pool, and 2) take into account local training, work-ups, and exercise
operations (each typically less than thirty days in duration). The maximum percent of
personnel deployed in Figure 3.4 is approximately fifteen percent for the years 1992
through 1996. The maximum percent personnel deployed in Figure 3.1 is approximately
fifty percent for the year 1996. This is a difference of thirty-five percent.
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2. Service Comparisons
Another misleading element with a graph of this type is the notion that
deployment percentages among the different Services can be compared. For example, it
looks like Navy PERSTEMPO is much higher than Air Force PERSTEMPO. The reason
one cannot make this assumption, or any other assumption when comparing
PERSTEMPO among the Services, is that each Service deploys forces and operates
differently on a daily basis. Each Service also "has different (1) definitions of what
constitutes a deployment, (2) policies or guidance for the length of time units or
personnel should be deployed, and (3) systems for tracking deployments" (U.S.
Government Accounting Office, 1996, p. 16). Table 3.5 indicates different measurement
systems among the Services.
Another element that must be considered when attempting to compare
deployment percentages among the different Services is family preparation time. For
example, the Navy and Marine Corps usually have deployment schedules drawn out far in
advance. The Air Force and Army have no such deployment schedules. Although
personnel from the Air Force and Army typically deploy for shorter periods of time, they
also typically have much shorter notifications of deployments. Quality of life issues for
military personnel, must not only take into account time away from homeport and home
bunk, but preparation time spent with family members preceding the deployment.
45
Table 3.5: Service Deployment Measurement Systems
Measurement Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps
Definition of
deployment:
7 days or more
(3 days for
Special Forces)
56 days or more 1 day or more





































Source: U.S. Government Accounting Office, 1996, p. 16.
C. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE PERSTEMPO
Another example of understated PERSTEMPO reporting is found in a report to
congressional requesters from the United States General Accounting Office. Figure 3.6 is
a graph taken from that report which indicates the estimated percent of personnel
deployed for each Service.
The most likely source of the data for Figure 3.6 is family separation allowance
figures. This is suggested by the statement at the bottom of the graph, "Marine Corps
data for September 1991 through March 1992 was excluded due to inaccurate reporting of
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family separation allowances" (U.S. Government Accounting Office, 1996, p. 4). Recall
that family separation allowance figures are the data that was used to produce Figure 3.4.
In summary, Figure 3.6 is essentially the same as Figure 3.4. The dates are
different but the percentages are similar, and the errors are the same.

















Note: Data from July 1990 through August 1991 was excluded to eliminate effects of the Gulf War.
Marine Corps data for September 1991 through March 1992 was excluded due to inaccurate reporting of family separation allowances.
DSeriesI
December '87 to June '90
Senes2
September '91 to March '95
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996, p. 4.
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D. BASELINE ENGAGEMENT FORCE ASSESSMENT THEMES
The Baseline Engagement Force Assessment revealed that PERSTEMPO
reporting among the Services is diverse in that reporting and tracking methods and
concepts differ. Because of a misunderstanding of reporting and tracking methods and
concepts, PERSTEMPO has been under-reported. Errors, by a factor often, consistently
occurred when reporting PERSTEMPO to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This may lead to profound negative impacts on the
effectiveness of planning and managing fleet exercises, peacekeeping operations, and
smaller-scale contingency operations.
Another finding was that the current PERSTEMPO is placing heavy demands on
the deployable pool, rather than the end strength. PERSTEMPO increases by twelve
percent when the deployable pool is placed in the denominator when calculating
deployment percentages.
Finally, the Baseline Engagement Force Assessment revealed that there is no tool
or model available for any of the Services to conduct real time assessments of
PERSTEMPO. As a result, it is difficult for the Services to measure deployment impacts
and provide long-term guidance and oversight on various PERSTEMPO issues affecting
personnel readiness, quality of life, unit cohesion, and career satisfaction. Chapter IV
will address these issues by focusing on the Baseline Engagement Force Model.
48
E. SUMMARY
Due to the reduction in force size, along with the increase in peacetime
engagements, the deployable force has been spending up to fifty percent of their nights
away from home port and home bunk (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment
Directorate, 1997). This PERSTEMPO rate may make it difficult for the Services to
recruit and retain the number and types of personnel needed for national security. The
Report ofthe Quadrennial Defense Review notes that "if not adequately managed, the
demand for peacetime operations, coupled with a smaller force, could overstress
personnel operating tempo and take its toll on the quality of life of military personnel that
is the foundation of long-term readiness" (1997, p. 37). Consequently, a high personnel
operating tempo could endanger the All-Volunteer Force concept.
The Baseline Engagement Force Assessment showed that there are multiple ways
of looking at the peacetime engagement and smaller-scale contingency demands on the
All-Volunteer Force. It showed that PERSTEMPO reporting among the Services is
diverse in that reporting methods and concepts differ. Because of a misunderstanding
among reporting methods and concepts, peacetime PERSTEMPO has been consistently
under-reported. Finally, the Baseline Engagement Force Assessment revealed that




IV. BASELINE ENGAGEMENT FORCE MODEL
The focus of this chapter is the personnel inventory and unit deployment model
developed by the RAND Corporation and the Systems Research and Applications (SRA)
Corporation for the Joint Staff. The model was derived from a Quadrennial Defense
Review requirement. Called the Baseline Engagement Force Model, it was developed to
assist senior decision-makers in assessing: 1) available capability, 2) unit deployability,
and 3) career impacts (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, 1997).
A. NEED FOR MODEL
At the completion of the Quadrennial Defense Review, there was a need for a
model that would articulate and calculate the demands that peacetime engagement and
smaller-scale contingency operations placed on the All-Volunteer Force. These demands
are best captured by PERSTEMPO measurements. The Baseline Engagement Force
Assessment revealed that there is no tool or model available for any of the Services to
conduct real time assessments ofPERSTEMO.
The Baseline Engagement Force Model was developed within the Forces and
Resources Policy Center ofRAND Corporation's National Defense Research Institute and
the Systems Research and Applications (SRA) Corporation. The Model was initially
built for the Army, with other Service models to follow.
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The Baseline Engagement Force Model, funded by the Force Structure,
Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) of the Joint Staff, allows for senior decision-
makers to assess three elements of military personnel management (U.S. Department of
Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force Structure, Resources,
and Assessment Directorate, 1997).
The first element is available capability. Force requirements have evolved from a
threat-based to a capability-based force. The availability of the force to respond is
assuming new importance. In a peacetime demand environment, committing a capability
today may limit that capability's availability in the future. This element is further
explained in this Chapter under a concept called "surge induced harmonics."
The second element is unit deployability. All units are different in their ability to
respond and deploy. The Model must have a detailed tracking and assessment system
that takes this into account.
The final element is career impacts. The Baseline Engagement Force Assessment
identified some of the stress that is being placed on the All-Volunteer Force. Before
committing U.S. forces to various operations, deployments, and other hardships, senior
decision-makers must understand the implications of such actions for military careers
over the long term.
B. BASIS OF MODEL
Each military unit depends on several complex factors that determine its ability to
perform a mission. The premise of the Baseline Engagement Force Model is that there
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are key personnel performance attributes that are critical to mission success. The RAND
and SRA Corporations, in conjunction with the Joint Staff, determined that a model can
be used to assess six key personnel performance attributes.
1. Personnel / Unit Readiness
The first performance attribute is personnel / unit readiness. U.S. policy is to
have the best equipped, best prepared, best trained, and most capable military forces.
These forces must quickly respond to threats, commitments, smaller-scale contingencies,
and major regional conflicts around the world. This policy represents an aggressive,
complicated, and aspiring goal for the U.S. military.
In general, maintaining readiness is not an easy task to accomplish, define, or
measure. However, personnel readiness, "tends to be straightforward— do units have
sufficient people in the right grade and skill to meet their resource design?" (RAND,
1998, p.2). This is the dimension of readiness addressed by the Baseline Engagement
Force Model.
2. Geographic Stability
The second performance attribute is geographic stability. Simply stated,
geographic stability is the "reasonable balance between military needs and individual and
family needs" (RAND, 1998, p. 2). In the unavoidable turbulence of the post-Cold War
period, various factors must be taken into consideration when creating a sense of stability
for military members. These include: 1) temporary duty assignments away from home,
2) compensation for poor living conditions and second-rate schooling for children (such
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as those found in many overseas bases), 3) deployments, 4) housing, 5) family support
when on deployment, and 6) personnel tempo.
The 1998 Annual Report to the President and the Congress emphasizes the
importance of personnel tempo as an important component of stability (U.S. Department
of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998). The report also notes that this is
an important issue to consider because personnel tempo has increased as force levels for
the Services have decreased. The bottom line is, if personnel tempo becomes too high, it
may have a negative effect on force stability.
3. Resiliency / Force Stress
The third performance attribute is resiliency /force stress. This is a measure of
the ability of Service units and members to adapt to a deployed status. It is also a
performance measure of missions conducted in a stressful and changing environment
when deployed. Service units or members that are overstressed are not resilient, i.e., they
lack "the capacity for continuous performance of the most arduous or most frequent
missions" (RAND, 1998, p. 3).
4. Unit Cohesion
The fourth performance attribute is unit cohesion. This is an integral bonding
characteristic ideally present in all Service units. It is a coordinated effort by members
acting together for a common cause. Unit cohesion "sustains commitment to one another
and gives congruence of effort of group members toward common goals" (RAND, 1998,
p. 3).
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5. Quality of Life
The fifth performance attribute is quality of life. This is an all encompassing term
that describes issues that support and give predictability and stability to military life and
military careers. Improving quality of life issues for Service members strengthens
readiness, recruiting, and retention issues (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, 1998).
6. Career Satisfaction
The sixth and final performance attribute is career satisfaction. This attribute
describes the extent to which Service members are pleased with the direction, outcome,
condition, and progression of their achievements in their profession.
Because each of the performance attributes is broad in scope and difficult to
measure, performance measures were selected as indicators ofperformance attributes.
For purposes of the Baseline Engagement Force Model, if the performance measure is
enhanced or becomes more desirable, performance attributes corresponding to that
performance measure are enhanced and become more desirable. Figure 4. 1 shows the
relationship between performance attributes (outcomes) and performance measures
(input).
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Source: RAND Study Group, 1998.
The six performance measures (input data for the Baseline Engagement Force
Model) are summarized in the remainder of this section.
The first performance measure is unit /skill group time on station. This is the
time that a military component or sub-specialty group spends at a location away from
home port / home bunk.
The second performance measure is availability ofunits. This is the extent to
which military components are accessible, trained, and ready for a mission.
The third performance measure is individual time on station. This is the time that
a military member spends at a location away from home port / home bunk (due to the
rotation of personnel from one command to another, this may or may not be the same
figure as unit /skill group time on station).
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The fourth performance measure is P-status distribution. This is a measure in the
personnel portion of Unit Readiness Reports. The P-status distribution is divided into
three components. Each component yields a percentage. These percentages can be
subdivided in order to describe a unit , a skill group within a unit, or a pay grade.
The first component of the P-status distribution is the number of personnel
assigned over the number of personnel authorized. An important aspect to consider with
this component is that even if a unit's percentage is 100, there still may be manning
problems. For example, a submarine gets underway with a crew of 100 percent (i.e., the
number of assigned over the number of authorized equals one). However, the electronic
technicians are manned at 80 percent and the sonar technicians are manned at 120
percent. This may create a scenario where the sonar technicians have a high resiliency
and the electronic technicians have a low resiliency.
The second component is the number of personnel available over the number of
personnel authorized. The difference between this component and the first component
described above is that not all members of a unit may be available to deploy. This can be
due to medical, administrative, or training issues. For example, a unit may prove to be
more effective in the accomplishment of its mission if it sends recently reported troops to
a military school vice deploying with the unit. These troops are authorized at the
command, but they are not available to the command for deployment purposes.
The third component is turnover rate. Turnover rate is a percentage that describes
the pace at which Service members are replaced by other Service members in a unit. For
example, a turnover rate of thirty percent per year would mean that thirty percent of the
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members of a unit leave for another command and are replaced by other Service members
in one year. For the junior officer submarine community, a typical sea tour at a command
is three years. Therefore, the turnover rate is about thirty-three percent (i.e., every three
years the entire junior officer wardroom will have been replaced).
The fifth performance measure is cross leveling distribution (individual
availability). This is the extent to which military members are accessible, trained, and
ready for a mission.
The sixth and final performance measure is lengths ofservice. This is a measure
of trends in career patterns.
Each of these six performance measures, indicators of performance attributes, is
an input for the Model. Inputs, and the way the Model produces outputs, will be further
discussed in the next section.
C. MODEL INPUT AND OUTPUT
The Baseline Engagement Force Model application runs on a personal computer
with a Windows 95 or Windows NT operating system. Input data for the Model come
from an Oracle database. Output data for the Model are used as input to MatLab,
Microsoft Access, or Microsoft Excel.
Output data can then be used to make graphs or charts that "depict turbulence,
personnel shortages, and tour curtailment averages over time at the theater, installation,
and unit level" (RAND, 1998, p. iv). Technical information about the Model is located in
Appendix B.
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1. Statistical Process Control
The Baseline Engagement Force Model uses the technique of statistical process
control (SPC). "Statistical process control, commonly employed in manufacturing
industries, is a suite of statistical techniques used to detect when processes change"
(RAND Study Group, 1998, p. 6). Over a period of time, data can be graphically
displayed and used as a decision tool for senior analysts and leaders.
Using the statistical process control technique, a process or policy has two sets of
control limits. Control limits are decision rules which define when a process is suspected
to have gone out of defined operating regions. The two sets ofbounds that define
desirable operating regions are: 1) an upper control limit (UCL) and a lower control limit
(LCL); and 2) an upper specification limit (USL) and a lower specification limit (LSL).
While it is not desirable for a process to be outside its control limits, the process is
still capable of functioning in this state. However, if outside its specification limits, the
process is neither desirable nor capable of functioning. For example, in industry, if a
steel tube is machined to a size that is outside the control limits, but within the
specification limits, it may not fit inside a cavity correctly (the steel tube may be slightly
too big and therefore fit too tight), but the machined part will work for an abbreviated
time. However, if the steel tube is machined to a size that is outside the specification
limits, it will not, in any way, fit inside the cavity. Ideally, a process would be within its
specification limits and its control limits.
For a Baseline Engagement Force Model example, see Figure 4.2. This figure
describes service member turnover rate for a fictitious unit with respect to time. At the
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four month time period, turnover rate gradually climbs (perhaps due to deployment
preparation for a smaller-scale contingency operation) to about fifty percent. Notice that
between the nine and fifteen month time period, turnover rate is above the upper control
limit, but below the upper specification limit. During this period, the process (turnover
rate) is not in control, but it is in specification. In other words, although not a desirable
situation, the unit is capable of functioning at this level of turnover (below fifty five
percent) for some period of time.
In this example, the reason the unit is capable of functioning (process is in
specification) is because senior leaders knew far enough in advance that the unit would be
preparing to deploy. In preparation to deploy, it was recognized that this unit would
experience higher levels of turnover. Consequently, the upper specification limit was
raised to fifty-five percent. This prevented the turnover rate from going above the upper
specification limit.
The upper control limit is set at forty-five percent because below this value,
turnover rate proves to be optimum for the unit during routine operations.
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Figure 4.3 is an example of one type of output that displays overall results from
all of the performance attributes for various time periods.
61










































































































































STATISTIC NOT IN CONTROL
STATISTIC NOT IN SPECIFICATION
Source: RAND Study Group, 1998
The left hand side of Figure 4.3 displays the six performance attributes. The time
period in months is displayed across the top. The upper light is color coded to indicate if
the statistic is within control limits (green is in control, yellow may not be in control, and
red is not in control). The lower light is color coded to indicate if units or individuals are





A major factor in determining the outcome of the performance attributes the
Baseline Engagement Force Model articulates is the deployment policy used by each
Service. In a sense, the Model attempts to articulate and capture what happens when
policy changes. For example, a typical six month Naval deployment is followed by a two
week stand-down upon return to home port. During this stand-down, personnel from that
unit report to work on duty days only (typically once every four or five days). If policy
changes such that stand-downs are now three weeks in length, senior decision makers and
analysts will be able to use Model outputs to assess how this may affect unit performance
attributes on ships and at squadrons.
The two basic types of measures the Model uses for this analysis are percentages
and time periods. Using the Navy stand-down policy example above, by inputting
several years of data into the Model, averages ofmany observations for a time period can
be evaluated and compared to other observations and distributions. A change in the
Model input will yield a change in the Model output. In this way, the two week stand-
down Model outputs can be compared to the three week stand-down Model outputs.
1. Surge Induced Harmonics
Another benefit of the Baseline Engagement Force Model is the ability to evaluate
what the Baseline Engagement Force Assessment called surge induced harmonics (U.S.
Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force
Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, 1997). Surge induced harmonics is a
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term that describes the fact that many peacetime engagement and smaller-scale
contingency demands impacting the All-Volunteer Force are not only affecting current
deployments, but they are also affecting the deployment recover period. See Figure 4.4
below.






Surge 2 (2nd contingency)
Surge 1 non-availability
Surge 2 n on- avail ability
Overcommitment?
Time
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force Structure, Resources,
and Assessment Directorate, 1997.
For every unit deployed (those above the horizontal line in Figure 4.4), there are
corresponding units that are in the recovery phase (those below the horizontal line in
Figure 4.4) that are not available to the Commander-in-Chiefs (CINCs) as assets. A
larger number of committed forces will yield higher curves above the horizontal line. At
a later time, when those forces are recovering, this will correspond to yielding a curve
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that reaches further below the horizontal line. If the recovery phase curve falls below a
predetermined amount (for example, the short horizontal line in Figure 4.4), the
Service(s) may be imposing a deployment overcommitment. In other words, a surge of
forces to a commitment (such as to Bosnia), will, at some later time, produce a surge of
forces, twice the size of the deployed forces, in a recovery period. The following
paragraph explains this concept further, using Air Force and Army policy.
The Air Force and Army have established a goal of limiting military members
from being away from home station to 120 days per year (U.S. Department of Defense,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1998). This means that the Air Force and Army must
have a recovery force twice as big as the deployed force in order to support this policy
(assuming approximately 360 days in a year). This is graphically displayed in Figure 4.4.
The Surge 1 recovery force is approximately twice as large as the Surge 1 deployed force.
The same can be said for the Surge 2 deployment force and the Surge 2 recovery force.
The Navy policy is somewhat different, but the same concept applies. The Navy
policy is that units deploying for fifty-six days or more will return home and spend twice
as long in the vicinity of home port as deployed. With a typical Navy deployment of six
months, there must be a recovery force twice the size of the deployed force in the vicinity
ofhome port.
What many assessments have failed to capture is that a Navy unit could come
back from a six month deployment, take a two week stand down, then go out to sea for
thirty days (less than fifty six days), and on the books, that would be within policy.
However, going out to sea for thirty days should be considered a deployment (i.e., an
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activity that will result in the Service member not being able to come home at night).
The Baseline Engagement Force Assessment determined that these types of deployments
(local training, work-ups, and exercise operations) are raising PERSTEMPO from twenty
eight percent to approximately fifty percent. It not only revealed that a high
PERSTEMPO such as fifty percent may make it difficult for the Services to recruit and
retain the number and types of personnel needed for national security, it also revealed that
a high PERSTEMPO may lead to profound negative impacts on the effectiveness of
planning and managing fleet exercises, peacekeeping operations, and smaller-scale
contingency operations.
2. Policy Change
Another advantage of the Baseline Engagement Force Model is its ability to
simulate policy changes. For example, one can simulate a change in the Air Force policy
of limiting days away from home station. A limit of 130 days away from home station
per year can be analyzed. The output of the Baseline Engagement Force Model can then
be compared with the current policy of 120 days maximum time away from home station
per year.
Similarly, the Baseline Engagement Force Model can simulate a Navy policy that
mandates no deployments of longer duration than five months. The output of the Model
can then be compared to the current Navy policy of no deployments of longer duration
than six months.
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For both the Air Force and Navy policy change examples above, there are two
opposing metrics or processes. More time on station may not be beneficial in that it
equates to a higher PERSTEMPO which may lead to lower resiliency and less unit
cohesion. However, a higher PERSTEMPO may be beneficial in that it may raise force
readiness by providing a training atmosphere that keeps units at peak readiness levels.
This allows Services to more effectively react to major theater war and smaller-scale
contingency response requirements.
From various policy comparisons, variable manipulations, and Model simulations,
analysts and senior decision makers can see how personnel readiness, geographic
stability, resiliency, unit cohesion, quality of life, and career satisfaction are affected by
deployment and training policy changes. More importantly, the Baseline Engagement
Force Model can provide each Service with the tools to be more efficient at formulating
and organizing deployment and training policies.
E. SUMMARY
The Baseline Engagement Force Model is a leadership tool. It was designed to
assist analysts and senior decision-makers in producing alternatives for reducing the
impact of deployments on military members. It was also intended to help determine
policy regarding the capabilities of the unit deployment and personnel management
process—a policy which the military hopes will create a force that is ready, stable,
satisfied, and cohesive.
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The Model was first developed for use by the Army. Although various Army
staff agencies have experimented with the Model, as of July of 1998 the Army is not
using it. While the Army has not completely abandoned the idea of using the Model in
the future, they have postponed a decision on its use. For the Army, the task of balancing
and determining deployment and personnel management issues has been delegated to
installation commanders (i.e., one or two star billets).
The Model was briefed to the Air Force. The Air Staff thought the Model would
be useful when analyzing deployment and personnel management data, specifically
looking at pilot retention and career satisfaction issues. However, the Air Force
Personnel Command did not consider the Model as useful as the Air Staff. The Personnel
Command believes their internal modeling efforts are sufficient for analyzing deployment
and personnel management data. As of July of 1998, the Air Force was not using the
Model.
The Model was scheduled to be developed for the Navy and Marine Corps last.
This was primarily because they needed the Model the least. The Navy and Marine
Corps typically have "set" deployment schedules that are forecasted long in advance.
They also respond to most crisis operations with already deployed forces. This is not true
for the Army and Air Force. They have more unpredictable deployments—responding to
crisis operations on short notice. Because of the limited use of the Model by the Army
and Air Force, the Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate of the Joint
Staff decided to not develop the Model for Navy or Marines Corps use.
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One advantage of having decentralized methods that analyze deployment and
personnel management information (i.e., methods at the installation level for each of the
Services) is that this level of effort may, to the solder or sailor, be perceived to be more
acceptable than centralized methods (i.e., methods developed inside the Pentagon). This
is due to the perception that Pentagon officials are not as knowledgeable regarding
PERSTEMPO issues as officials at the unit or individual level.
There may come a time when the Office of the Secretary of Defense queries the
Services for explicit, concrete deployment and personnel management data (i.e., discrete
data at the individual, unit, installation, theater, and Service level). When that occurs, the
Baseline Engagement Force Model could be used to produce data at each of those five
levels. When data such as this can not be found using decentralized methods, the
Services may revert to, or recognize a need for, the Baseline Engagement Force Model.
When addressing the personnel reductions called for in the Report ofthe
Quadrennial Defense Review, General Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, stated that, "we must have the proper programs in place with adequate resources
to carry out these reductions in a manner that honors our obligations to those who have
served us so well" (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 1997, p. 68). He added that, "we will continue to develop our
management information and policies until we can carry out the strategy without over-
stressing the force" (p. 68). The Baseline Engagement Force Model represents this
imperative to develop personnel management tools for the post Cold War environment.
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V. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONS
The quality of life of our military personnel must be commensurate
with the sacrifices we ask them to make (U.S. Department of Defense,
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997).
A. SUMMARY
The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new world order has presented
the United States with increasingly new, difficult, and complex challenges and
opportunities. This thesis begins by providing information on these challenges and
opportunities, and the uncertain future reflected by the National Security Strategy and the
National Military Strategy. U.S. involvement in these challenges and opportunities, in
the form of peacekeeping and smaller-scale contingency operations, combined with
significant reductions in the size of the All-Volunteer Force and Department of Defense
budget, has resulted in very high personnel tempos and related readiness concerns.
Fostering a more stable and peaceful world will require the U.S. military to
continue its efforts to effectively conduct peacekeeping and smaller-scale contingency
operations around the world. These operations are important for our National Security,
but they demand a trade-off. Increasing foreign missions for National Security, along
with decreasing Department of Defense personnel and dollars, can have negative effects
on personnel, maintenance, training, and overall readiness.
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B. TEMPO CHALLENGES
Mostly due to an increase in the number of smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs)
and the reduction of U.S. military forces stationed overseas since the end of the Cold
War, operating tempo has increased (U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary
of Defense, 1998).
As of January 1998, U.S. military presence spanned 100 countries. In 31 of those
countries, we had at least 100 personnel (Newman, 1998). From 1980 to 1989 the U.S.
military was involved in 22 foreign missions. From 1990 to 1998 that number increased
to 36 foreign missions (Newman, 1998). During this same month (January) in 1998,
there were fifteen United Nations peacekeeping / non-conflict operations around the
world manned by approximately 15,000 troops, military observers, and police from 71
countries (The Defense Monitor, 1 998).
There are various ways of looking at and interpreting personnel tempo. Because
of studies like the Baseline Engagement Force Assessment, the Department ofDefense
better understands the peacetime engagement demand on our All-Volunteer Force and has
several initiatives underway to articulate and better understand this demand.
C. LESSONS LEARNED
The All-Volunteer Force of the late 1990s is doing more with less and this is not
expected to change in the near future. The Department of Defense budget has been
declining, measured in constant dollars, over the past fourteen years. Manpower has also
been declining—a reduction of approximately 760,000 active duty personnel over the
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past 13 years. The combination of these two factors has created a situation where leaders
must pay careful attention to managing the resulting quality of life, readiness, and
modernization issues.
1. Baseline Engagement Force Assessment
The focus of this thesis is a DoD assessment that explores one aspect of readiness-
--OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO issues. The assessment, conducted by the Force Structure,
Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) of the Joint Staff, called the Baseline
Engagement Force (BEF) Assessment, was developed to gain quantifiable insights
regarding the level of effort required to support peacetime engagement and enlargement
with an All-Volunteer Force. It was a collaborative effort among the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the Military Services, and selected
Commanders in Chief (CINCs).
This effort had its origins in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process.
During the QDR process, a need developed to quantify the demand on the All-Volunteer
Force and the amount of effort required to support peacetime engagement activities. It
became apparent that the Services were not able to produce a broad and quantifiable data
base to articulate peacetime demand. A major portion of this demand is quantified by
using OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO data. Service OPTEMPO data were available but
PERSTEMPO data were not.
The QDR process and the BEF Assessment revealed important differences
between OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO. OPTEMPO is the tempo of units. It is driven
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by one factor, unit schedules. Unit schedules are largely determined by the number of
peacekeeping and smaller-scale contingency operations.
PERSTEMPO refers to the level of activity of individuals. It is primarily driven
by two factors, OPTEMPO and the size of the deployable pool. The size of the
deployable pool affects personnel rotations from one unit to another (within the
deployable pool). Personnel rotations affect the length of time a military member spends
with a unit, and therefore affects PERSTEMPO. If force manning is reduced, the size of
the deployable pool is correspondingly reduced, directly affecting PERSTEMPO.
For example, ifOPTEMPO remains at a constant level, and the deployable pool
size is reduced, PERSTEMPO will increase because of the reduced ability of the Services
to rotate "new" personnel into the deployable pool (i.e., Lieutenant Jones and Private
Ryan will remain in the deployable pool for four years vice three years before transferring
to a non-deployable pool installation).
Until the mid-1990s, OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO were considered
essentially the same. The QDR process and the BEF Assessment revealed these
important distinctions. The BEF Assessment indicated that PERSTEMPO reporting
among the Services is diverse in that reporting and tracking methods and concepts differ.
Because of a misunderstanding of reporting and tracking methods and concepts,
PERSTEMPO has been under-reported. During fiscal year 1 996, errors consistently
occurred when reporting PERSTEMPO to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sometimes by as much as a factor often.
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Another finding was that the current PERSTEMPO is placing heavy demands on
the deployable pool, not the total Service end strength. While each Service had a
definition of deployment, the deployable pool was not defined. The deployable pool
consists of forces available to immediately respond to a crisis. The BEF Assessment
defined deployable pool to establish a concrete standard for determining deployment
percentages for all the Services. PERSTEMPO increases by twelve percent when the
deployable pool is used when calculating deployment data. Findings such as these, if not
quickly corrected, may lead to profound negative impacts on the effectiveness of
planning and managing fleet exercises, peacekeeping operations, and smaller-scale
contingency operations.
The BEF Assessment also revealed that there is no tool or model available for any
of the Services to conduct real time assessments ofPERSTEMPO. As a result, it is
difficult for the Services to measure deployment impacts and provide long-term guidance
and oversight on various PERSTEMPO issues affecting personnel readiness, quality of
life, and career satisfaction.
Finally, although not specifically addressed in Chapter III, the BEF Assessment
revealed that within the deployable pool, selected skills are experiencing exceptionally
high PERSTEMPO. In an effort to better manage these skills, Services could selectively
reduce manning in under-utilized skills and raise manning in skills that are experiencing
exceptionally high PERSTEMPO.
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2. Baseline Engagement Force Model
The Baseline Engagement Force Model is a leadership tool that was designed to
assist analysts and senior decision-makers in producing alternatives for reducing the
impact of deployments on military members. The Model is able to produce discrete data
at the individual, unit, installation, theater, and Service level. It was also intended to help
determine policy regarding the capabilities of the unit deployment and personnel
management process—a policy which the military hopes will create a force that is ready,
stable, and satisfied.
Although the Army has experimented with the BEF Model, and the Air Force was
briefed about the BEF Model, as of July of 1998, they were not using it. For the Army,
the task of balancing and determining deployment and personnel management issues has
been delegated to installation commanders (i.e., one or two star billets). While some Air
Force commands considered the Model useful, other commands did not, indicating that
they believe their internal modeling efforts (at the installation level) are sufficient for
analyzing deployment and personnel management data.
Because of the limited use of the Model by the Army, the Force Structure,
Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) of the Joint Staff did not develop the Model
for Air Force, Navy, or Marines Corps use. While the Services have not completely
abandoned the idea of using the Model in the future, they have postponed a decision on
its use.
One advantage of using decentralized methods to analyze deployment and
personnel management information (i.e., methods at the installation level for each of the
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Services) is that this level of effort may, to the solder or sailor, be perceived to be more
acceptable than centralized methods (i.e., methods developed inside the Pentagon). This
may be due to a perception that Pentagon officials are not as knowledgeable regarding
PERSTEMPO issues as officials at the installation level.
D. CONCLUSIONS
When I travel to various commands and ask the troops about
quality of life issues, they tell me they have had too much time away from
their families because they were involved with missions that they do not
see as a threat to the national security of the U.S.
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison
Speech on the Senate Floor
July 30, 1998
The demands for U.S. military presence around the world are not likely to abate
over the next decade. Ifwe are to have high quality armed forces that can engage in two
nearly simultaneous major theater wars and conduct numerous smaller-scale contingency
operations, we must have ready, high quality personnel. In order to recruit and retain
high quality personnel and maintain a high state of readiness, our leadership must better
understand the supply and demand sides of military quality of life, readiness, and
personnel tempo issues.
Those on the demand side need to understand that we no longer have Cold War
force levels, infrastructures, and resources. If the All-Volunteer Force concept is to
remain in place, civilian and military leadership needs to carefully assess the extent of
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military participation in peacetime engagement activities and smaller-scale contingency
operations.
Those on the supply side need to understand the efforts that are underway to better
measure and manage the demands on our All-Volunteer Force. The Baseline
Engagement Force Model was one of these efforts. It is a leadership tool designed to
assist analysts and senior decision-makers in producing alternatives for reducing the
impact of deployments on military members. It was also intended to help determine
policy regarding the capabilities of the unit deployment and personnel management
process. Although the BEF Model has seen limited use by the Services, the Services may
recognize a need for the Model in the future. The BEF Model may prove to be a basis for
building decentralized models and methods that will assist in the task of balancing and
determining deployment and personnel management policies.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Civilian and military Department ofDefense leaders continue to look for ways to
address growing resource cutbacks and other military personnel manpower issues.
Recommendations for further research would be to assess the effectiveness of different
personnel management tools, policies, and issues.
One topic to research is to determine a method to better measure PERSTEMPO.
Another research topic is to define the extent to which Reserve and National Guard forces
can contribute to peacekeeping and smaller-scale contingency operations. An additional
research topic is the Global Military Force Policy (GMFP) and its ability to identify Low
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Density High Demand (LDHD) assets and the extent to which OPTEMPO can be
maintained without having an adverse impact on LDHD assets. A further research topic
is the Global Naval Force Presence Policy (GNFPP) and its relation to the GMFP. A
final topic for further research is the Navy's Horizon concept—a proposal for rotating
crews instead of ships at sea.
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APPENDIX A KEY AREAS OF CONFLICT AROUND THE WORLD
Country Conflict
Afghanistan Civil war since 1978
Albania Civil unrest
Algeria Armed insurgency
Angola Political unrest inside the government
Azerbaijan Conflict with Armenia
Bangladesh Ethnic tension since 1975
Bosnia-
Herzegovina
Civil war since 1993
Burundi Inter-ethnic conflict
Cambodia First and second Prime Minister tensions
Carlow Sporadic conflict
Chad Unrest among the government and Codos rebel movement
China (PRC) Regular armed clashes with security authorities by Uighur
Islamists
Colombia Guerilla activity by leftist guerillas and quasi-military units
of narco groups
Comoros Sessionist movement
Congo (Dem. Rep.) Civil war
Cyprus Unresolved intrastate conflict
Ecuador Continued border tensions with Peru
Egypt Armed insurgency
Ethiopia Cross-border tensions with Sudan
Georgia Unresolved secessionist war in Abkhazia region
India Nuclear weapons testing and border tensions with Pakistan
over disputed territory in Kashmir
Indonesia Separatist movements: East Timor, Sumatra, and Irian Jaya
Iran Sporadic armed conflict with Kurds
Iraq Sporadic armed conflict between Government and Kurds;
continued tensions with the U.S. over weapons inspections
Israel/South
Lebanon
Sporadic armed conflict with Palestinian groups, various
Lebanese armed factions, and Arab states
Kenya Political unrest and ethnic conflicts
Korea Technical state of war exists between North Korea (DPRK)
and South Korea (ROK)
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Liberia Civil war since 1989
Macedonia Sporadic ethnic conflict
Malaysia Cross-border tension with Thailand
Moldova Sporadic armed conflict
Morocco Separatist movement
Mexico Armed insurgency
Myanmar Ongoing civil war
Nigeria Inter-ethnic violence
Pakistan Ethnic and political violence; nuclear tests and border
tensions with India over disputed territory in Kashmir
Palestinian National
Authority (PNA)
Sporadic armed internal conflict between the PNA and
opposition groups
Papua New Guinea Separatist movement
Peru Maoist guerilla activity; border tensions with Ecuador
Philippines 24-year separatist war
Russia Chechnya, armed separatist movement; armed conflict
between the Ossetian and Ingush in North Ossetia
Rwanda Police action after civil war
Sierra Leone Continuing unrest following overthrow of civilian
Government president
Somalia Clan warfare has left Somalia without a central government
since 1991
Spain Basque insurrection led by the Euzkadi ta Askasuna (ETA)
Sri Lanka Separatist civil war between ethnic Tamils and the central
Government
Sudan Ethnic and religious civil war between the Arab Muslim
north (Government) and the African Christian south
Tajikistan Civil war involving several insurgency groups
Turkey Kurdish guerilla activity
United Kingdom Northern Ireland—insurrection by separatist Irish Republican
Army (IRA)
Yugoslavia Sporadic religiously-based insurgency in Sanjak; ethnic
Albanian separatist actions in the province ofKosovo; unrest
in Montenegro
Zambia Domestic unrest
Zimbabwe Army troops deployed in capital city of Harare to control
rioting and unrest
Source: Defense and Foreign Affairs Group. Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic
Policy . February-March 1998, pp. 5-7.
82
APPENDIX B TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF BASELINE ENGAGEMENT
FORCE MODEL
The Baseline Engagement Force Model application requires a minimum computer
processor speed of 200 MHz, with a minimum ram of 32MB. A computer running at 266
MHz with 128 MB of ram is recommended.
All data is maintained on the local hard drive. Twelve MB of disk space is
required for installation of the Baseline Engagement Force Model application. Models
where up to 99 months of data were analyzed required an additional 120 - 200 MB of
disk space (RAND, 1998).
A typical time required to analyze 8 years of data for one military occupational
specialty is about 45 minutes. The output from such an analysis would yield about 140
MB of data (RAND, 1998). The data can then be used to make graphs or charts that
"depict turbulence, personnel shortages, and tour curtailment averages over time at the
heater, installation, and unit level" (RAND, 1998, p. iv).
The Baseline Engagement Force Model is year 2000 compliant and is coded in 32
bit C++, an object oriented software. Programmers used Microsoft Visual C++, version
4, with additional functionality in the Model being derived from using the following
additional Commercial Off The Shelf software: 1) C-Tree Plus, version 6.6, by FairCom,
used for database management; 2) Tab Pro, version 2, by Far Point, used for main screen
tab control; 3) Spread, version 2.5, by Far Point, used for the spreadsheet view; and 4)
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DoD Department of Defense
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